Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2020

Toward a holistic model of deception: Subject matter expert validation
Iain D. Reid
University of Portsmouth
Iain.reid@port.ac.uk

Abstract
Security challenges require greater insight and
flexibility into the way deception can be identified and
responded to. Deception research in interactions has
identified behaviors indicative of truth-telling and
deceit. Deception in military environments has focused
on planning deception, where approaches have been
developed to deceive others, but neglecting counterdeception perspectives. To address these challenges a
holistic approach to deception is advocated. A
literature review of deception was conducted followed
by validation interviews with Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs). Explanatory thematic analysis of interviews
conducted with SMEs (n=19) led to the development of
meta-themes related to the ‘deceiver’, their ‘intent;
‘strategies and tactics’ of deception, ‘interpretation’ by
the target and ‘target’ decision-making strengths and
vulnerabilities. This led to the development of the
Holistic Model of Deception (HMD), an approach
where strategies reflect context. The implications of
this approach are considered alongside the limitations
and future directions required to validate the HMD.

1. Introduction
The current paper defines deception as “a
deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in
another a belief which the communicator considers to
be untrue, with the aim of influencing the receivers’
mindset (manner of thinking structured by their
attitudes, personality and culture) and/or behavior”.
This definition is applicable across interpersonal and
mediated environments, whether the act is verbal, nonverbal or physical, and emphasizes that the aim of
deception is to change the receiver’s behavior through
implanting or enabling the target to generate a false
belief, ensuring applicability to online and military
environments. This definition of deception is a
refinement of that of [48] who primarily focus on
deception, but we incorporate cognition and behavior.
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[41] propose a theoretical holistic model of
deception incorporating traditional and differential
recall enhancement (DRE) [9] approaches to credibility
assessment alongside multiple-cue and multiplesourcing approaches. A further consideration of the
effects of culture, personality and individual
differences, motive and mindset are discussed.
Deception cannot be avoided; indeed deception will
occur whenever and wherever adversaries are seeking
an advantage [3, 51]. Deception should be anticipated
as occurring across a range of environments and
greater understanding of how deception emerges and is
responded to in complex environments is required. In
this article, holistic, online, and military approaches to
deception are reviewed, before the validation of a
holistic approach to deception through interviews with
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) including researchers
and practitioners working in diverse fields of
deception.

2. Literature Review
2.1. Holistic Approaches
Holistic approaches to deception combine verbal
and non-verbal cues [39, 45], and knowledge of
background, personality, cognition, culture and
environmental factors [31] to increase accuracy in
detecting deception. As credibility assessment may be
adversely affected in cognitively challenging and
group decision-making environments [31] there is a
need to implement a bespoke holistic approach to
deception detection which incorporates an
understanding of decision-making to counter potential
vulnerabilities.
[4] counter-deception approach examines
‘intelligence functions’ including deception cues,
deception detection and exposure, adversary discovery
and penetration alongside ‘operational functions’
incorporating mitigation and exploitation of adversary
deception. These functions are argued to be highly
interdependent and present deception as a continuum
of functions rather than individual elements [4].
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Human reasoning and self-assessment of own biases,
beliefs and methods of intelligence gathering, and
intelligence-gathering channels will identify potential
vulnerabilities potentially mitigating the effects of
deception [4]. Multiple channels of information enable
a greater range of HUMINT with which to assess
credibility [4]. Threat and situation assessments are
required to understand the influences and
circumstances in which deception may occur [4] and
such approaches parallel more recent psychological
approaches to understanding high-stakes future intent
[19].
To increase accuracy in deception detection in
complex operating environments, [41] propose using a
combination of verbal, nonverbal and paralinguistic
cues to deception alongside a consideration of
personality and individual differences, motive, mindset
and consideration of decision-making. Cues are argued
to reflect context and may not be applicable across all
instances of deception [2]. The multiple cue approach
incorporates consideration of low-stakes [47], high
stakes [39] and rapid judgement [47] environments and
hence such evidence supports a holistic, tailored
approach. [41] propose multiple-sourcing alongside
multiple-cues whereby different sources of information
can be examined for consistency increasing available
knowledge for credibility judgements. The
incorporation of the CHAMELEON Approach [18]
(which focuses on targeting interviewing strategies
according to context) into a holistic approach to
deception by [41] highlights that individual’s behavior
and the strategies they use to present themselves
change across contexts. The impact of culture,
religiosity and belief system on deception is
incorporated into a holistic approach to deception [41].

2.2. Online Approaches
Deception detection in online contexts may be
challenging [17] and requires consideration of
linguistic patterns [22], the use of ‘warrants’
(connections between online and real-world identities)
to confirm a sender’s identity [50], ‘digital footprints’
and ‘scent trails’ to uncover malign intent [42], and
adaptations of computer-mediated investigative
interviewing approaches [9, 15, 29]. Regarding the
influence of third party opinions, [36] examined the
linguistic features of online reviews to identify truthful
and deceptive opinions and found that truthful reviews
contained more concrete and sensorial language and
were more accurate about spatial information, whilst
deceivers focused upon elements not directly related to
the subject they were reviewing and, in contrast to
previous research [35], used more positive language.
This has implications for understanding the content of

opinions and speeches posted in online environments,
especially in higher stake situations where such views
can sway public belief and behavior, for example,
reviews may have a large impact on auction fraud,
whilst deceptive opinions may affect support for ongoing regional conflicts.
In the online environment the ability to alter
identity benefits those who engage in malign acts,
regardless of the deceptive nature of the behavior. The
malign intent of a child sexual offender purporting to
be a child while grooming a victim, or a sadistic stalker
who presents in a chameleon manner provides a more
concerning presentation of behavior and intent. This
becomes further problematic when offending behavior
is online and offline and individuals use aliases to
reduce the likelihood of detection. The use of
‘warrants’ enable links to be examined between an
individual’s real-world and online identities [50] and
deception may occur more routinely in online chat
environments that enable greater anonymity, and less
often in the use of email where warrants are visible but
can be modified to mislead. Although examining
‘warrants’ may be a useful strategy for assessing
credibility in low-stakes online interactions, in highstake interactions the levels of sophistication employed
by groups and individuals to cover their identities and
tracks are greater, as is the motivation, level of
resources and ability to manipulate.
Uncovering hidden deception and malign intent
across interpersonal and online environments can
include the identification of ‘digital footprints’, ‘digital
exhaust’ or ‘scent trails’ that can be coupled with
collateral evidence such as surveillance footage [14,
42]. Although rarely the focus of traditional deception
approaches, examining patterns of behavior, including
email communications, online statements and online
searches of information about potential targets [14]
may enable the identification of concealed actions. In a
holistic approach to deception, a proactive stance is
required where potential adversaries are being
monitored to ensure that information is collated and
assessed for deceit. Furthermore, there is potential for
collected evidence to be later used in investigative
interviews with which to challenge suspect’s
narratives.

2.3. Military Approaches
Approaches to detecting deception in the military
environment have focused on analysis of competing
hypotheses (ACH) [26, 43], the Busby-Whaley
Ombudsmen technique, and a more holistic approach
to counter-deception advocated by [4]. ACH consists
of a series of steps firstly involving the identification of
possible hypotheses, secondly listing evidence and

Page 1866

assumptions for and against each hypothesis, thirdly
drawing tentative conclusions about the likelihood of
each hypothesis, analysis of the sensitivity of the
conclusion to significant evidence, and lastly the
identification of future observations that would
confirm or eliminate the hypotheses [43]. To counter
confirmation biases and aid decision-making [26]
recommends that there should be an increased
emphasis on seeking refutations for hypotheses rather
than confirmations. ACH is a promising method of
supporting decision-making processes involved in
detecting deception, as there is the potential to
incorporate a broader range of factors including human
behavior, motivation, intent and mindset alongside
evidence developed from HUMINT.
[52] propose a theory of counter-deception based
upon approaches applicable to multiple contexts. They
identified nine categories of cues (pattern, players,
intention, payoff, place, time, strength, style and
channel) which are elements that the deceiver may
conceal or reveal during deception [52]. The major
principle of this approach is the ‘plus-minus rule’
where cues may indicate deception by their presence or
absence and the ‘congruity-incongruity rule’ is
suggested where deception may prove challenging to
identify and requires further investigation [52].
Techniques include: ‘Locard’s exchange principle’ –
where a deceiver may leave evidence at the scene and
take some away; ‘verification’ – of the deception; ‘the
law of multiple sensors’ – examination of multiple
channels for deceit; ‘passive and active detection’ – the
examination of current evidence and the search for
further
evidence;
‘pre-detection’
–
where
understanding an adversary’s deception modus
operandi, goals and capabilities may uncover potential
deception; ‘penetration and counterespionage’ –
uncovering an adversary’s plans through espionage and
neutralizing adversary operatives to protect target
infrastructure; ‘the prepared mind and intuition’ –
where preparation for deception and the intuition to
detect it enables counter-deception; and ‘indirect
thinking and the third option’ – the ability to detect
potential adversary options for deception is required
for counter-deception. [52] final element is the
‘Ombudsman
Method’
where
irrelevances,
discrepancies and misdirection are examined alongside
indirect thinking and intuition [4]. This approach to
deception detection appears promising where elements
may be adopted towards a holistic approach
particularly regarding using multiple sources of
HUMINT, and active deception detection alongside
alternative ways of considering threats.
A bespoke, tailored approach to deception creates
individual assessments of veracity across situations and
ultimately meets the requirements of practitioners. The

current research seeks to refine and expand the
theoretical holistic approach to deception developed by
[41] through interviews with SMEs in deception. In
military environments there are limited opportunities
for practitioners to develop skills necessary in
countering adversary deception and in deceiving
others; to overcome this limitation [52] propose an
incorporation of knowledge from a wide range of areas
to identify techniques used to uncover deception.
Through adopting an in vivo approach to research and
incorporating a wide range of SME knowledge a more
robust approach to deception detection can be
developed.

3. Data Collection Method
3.1. Participants
An opportunistic, snowballing sample enabled the
recruitment of 19 SMEs in deception. The sample
comprised 14 (74%) males and 5 (26%) females, of
which, 15 (79%) were European and 4 (21%) were
North American. The average length of expertise
within the SME cohort was 17.6 years (SD = 11.46)
ranging from 5 to 42 years’ experience. Participants
had expertise in both singular and multiple areas of
deception. Overall participants had expertise in the
following areas: interpersonal deception (N = 12),
online deception (N = 6), military deception (N = 5),
influence (N = 2) and personality (N = 4).

3.2. Materials
Interview schedules were developed for the
interpersonal, online and military domains of deception
and credibility assessment. Interview questions were
designed to elicit SMEs knowledge of deception.
Interview questions were focused around the
environments in which deception occurs, strategies that
deceivers use to convince others of their credibility, the
potential impact of personality on deception, current
strategies of deception detection and potential ways to
improve them, parallels between the domains of
deception, and the identification of potential future
threats. A digital Dictaphone was used to record
interviews which were stored securely on an Ironkey to
ensure security and transcribed verbatim. Hardcopies
were additionally stored in a secure environment.

3.3. Procedure
Participants were identified as SMEs if they had
academic or practitioner experience in deception.
Participants were initially approached via email or
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face-to-face contact and followed up by an email
inviting them to participate in research seeking to
develop a holistic model of deception. Of the 41
individuals who were asked to participate in the
research, 19 agreed. A general interview schedule was
included as an email attachment to enable participants
to examine the questions being asked of them, although
interviews were further tailored to SMEs areas of
expertise. Due to the nature of some of the work
undertaken by SMEs approached, two different
interview schedules were made available to
participants, one interview schedule including
interpersonal and online topics was provided to
participants without appropriate security clearances
and another interview schedule including interpersonal,
online and military topics was provided to those
participants with appropriate security clearances. Once
participants had read through the information sheet and
agreed to participate in the research, they were
informed that their data would be anonymized and
stored in a secure location, that they had a two-week
window to withdraw their data if they so choose.
Participants were then interviewed at a location of their
choice and convenience. Following the interviews
participants were debriefed about the aims of the
research and thanked for their input. Ethical approval
for this research was granted by the Ethics Committee
of the School of Psychology of the University of
Lincoln.

3.4. Data Analysis
Responses were transcribed verbatim and treated
from a critical realist perspective [6] where responses
were considered as reflecting reality whilst
acknowledging they were generated as part of the
interview procedure. An explanatory thematic analysis
[21] at the semantic level was conducted according to
the conventions outlined by [6]. First, familiarization
with the data set occurred through transcription, and
initial idea generation. Second, initial coding of
relevant data was conducted. All codes were discussed
with the research team and revised according to their
input. Third, codes were gathered together into themes.
Fourth, themes were reviewed against coded extracts
and the entire data set. Fifth, clear naming and defining
of themes was conducted, followed by the sixth stage,
construction of the report. The explanatory thematic
analysis resulted in the generation of 5 meta-themes
across the process of deception.

4. Analysis and Discussion
4.1. Key Findings

Analysis of SMEs responses led to the
identification of 5 meta-themes related to the process
of deception and its detection, including the metathemes of ‘Deceiver’, ‘Intent’, ‘Deception Tactics’,
‘Interpretation’ and ‘Target’ (See Figure 1). These
themes put forward a comprehensive view of deception
from the deceiver actions, intentions, deception
components, information interpretation, and target
elements, including vulnerabilities.

Figure 1: Holistic Model of Deception
The Holistic Model of Deception (HMD)
integrates interpersonal deception theory (IDT) [7] and
features-based models of credibility [12, 27, 30, 33,
53]. The HMD proposes that the context will affect the
form of interaction used, how the deceiver will behave
in that interaction and the techniques that will be
deployed to detect deception. Multiple interpretation
techniques, where applicable, can be used
simultaneously to detect deception building upon
recommendations by [39] that multiple-cues to
deception are used, multiple sources will also be used
alongside an awareness of personality, individual
differences, mindset and background history.
[41] proposed a model of deception, which focused
upon the elements of deception and provided a
framework of individual differences that will affect the
deceiver and the target. The HMD has built upon this
model through the examination of diverse deception
elements and individual differences across the
deceiver, their intent, their strategy, ways of
interpreting information and the target. Understanding
the process of deception requires an iterative process
where the HMD will be revised in future to reflect new
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developments in understanding of the deceiver, their
intent, deception tactics, strategies of interpreting
information
and
assessing
credibility
and
understandings of the target’s decision-making
processes. The key findings of each theme are outlined
below.

4.2. Deceiver
The first meta-theme identified from the dataset
was ‘Deceiver’, this meta-theme incorporates subthemes related to ‘Stakes’, ‘Impression Management’,
‘Motivation’, ‘Background History’, ‘Deceiver
Vulnerabilities’, ‘Target Audience Analysis’, and
‘Planning Spontaneity’. The themes examine factors
influencing how the deceiver makes decisions
regarding deception and their potential ability to appear
credible whilst deceiving. High-stakes situations may
prove more challenging to appear credible [46] than in
low-stakes where deceit may have little consequence.
High-stakes situations are argued to increase anxiety
and cognitive load in some deceivers leading to the
identification of cues to deceit [39]. In strategic
environments deceivers may place more emphasis
upon carefully designing deception plans to avoid
highlighting cues to deceit.
‘Impression Management’ examines the strategies,
which the deceiver uses to appear credible to others
across different environments. Previous research has
focused upon how people manage their statements [24]
and body language [28] and [18] proposed a series of
distinct personality-based behaviors which are used to
influence and persuade others of their credibility.
Online approaches to impression management have
focused upon the design features of websites and how
people present themselves [47]. Incorporating
‘Impression Management’ into a holistic model of
deception will enable practitioners assessing veracity
in security and intelligence settings to understand the
ways in which people and information are constructed
to appear credible according to context.
The ‘Motivation’ of the deceiver will have an
impact on how they deceive others and the deceiver’s
motivation is closely linked to the ‘Stakes’ of the
situation. In interpersonal deception, motivation has
been found to impair deceiver’s ability to deceive
others [11]. However, this may not occur in all
circumstances, as individual differences will influence
cognitive abilities during interviewing. In the online
environment ‘Motivation’ has an enhancing effect on
deception [23]. This would suggest that motivated
deceivers would seek to influence others through
online communication channels where there is an
increased chance of success. ‘Motivation’ will affect
how far the deceiver is willing to plan their deception

and this may vary according to goals and the context in
which to achieve these goals.
‘Background History’ of the deceiver, including
their personality, individual differences, their culture
and language, and previous interactions with the target
is required in a holistic model of deception as this will
affect their interactions with the target and the
strategies, they use to deceive them. This includes their
mindset at the commencement of the deceit.
Knowledge of an adversary’s background history,
culture, individual differences and mindset factors [31,
40] can increase our ability to accurately detect
deception; the current research further incorporates
knowledge of personality and its impact on deception,
alongside knowledge of previous interactions with the
adversary and what the outcomes were. An
individual’s culture and language will present
additional challenges to the target as this affects how
they will view information presented by a deceiver
from another culture [16]. In multicultural operating
environments an awareness of the impact of culture is
required to avoid decision-making errors. [18]
highlight that individual’s background histories and
previous experiences will affect how they will behave
in future interactions, and these same principles can be
applied to the holistic model of deception.
‘Deceiver Vulnerabilities’ will affect how the
deceiver will appear credible to others and open up
pathways of detecting deception. The impact of
emotional arousal, cognitive load and decision-making
biases will adversely affect the deceiver’s ability to
appear credible. The lack of emotions in some contexts
adversely affects deceivers whereby they fail to present
emotions that are expected, and that truth-tellers often
experience [45]. Cognitive load adversely affects
deceivers as it reduces capacity to present a credible
argument [48]. These vulnerabilities in the deceiver
can be exploited during the ‘Interpretation’ phase of
the model and cues to deceit identified.
When seeking to deceive others, ‘Target Audience
Analysis’ is often conducted which will enable a
deceiver to develop an enhanced understanding of the
audience and identify key individuals and
organizations to target. A deceiver’s ability to
successfully conduct ‘Target Audience Analysis’
affects their ability to influence the target through
whatever strategy has been selected for influence, and
deceiver skill will play a role in how effective this is
[32]. Although ‘Target Audience Analysis’ as a
concept has emerged from strategic environments the
idea of deceivers carefully selecting and exploiting the
target can be seen in both interpersonal and online
environments. The deceiver may carefully develop or
spontaneously perform an act of deception to a specific
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target and ‘Planning Spontaneity’ emerged as a subtheme in the data.
Different levels of preparation are required for
different situations where there is a need to appear
credible. The level of planning that the deceiver puts
into their deception will affect their ability to convince
others that they are credible [44]. The current research
highlights that poor planning can be identified or that
deceiver’s strategies may subsequently collapse from
challenges to their narrative. However, in long-term
strategic deception, planning will play far great
emphasis highlighting adversaries should be monitored
and assessed for threat.

4.3. Intent
A need to understand the ‘Intent’ of the deceiver
emerged from the data as a meta-theme, whereby
understanding an individual’s motive and intent for
engaging in deception will enable preparation for
adversary deception to prevent vulnerabilities [19].
Differing intents to deceive whether to avoid being
incarcerated for an act of criminality or to increase
survival chances in a combat situation show a strong
need to understand that deception occurs where there is
intent. Past research has sought to uncover malign
intent through questioning strategies [20]. However, it
may be more pertinent to understand intent as part of a
holistic approach to deception where the intent to
deceive is regulated by adversary aims and motives
and how situational elements will affect the timing of
when deception occurs. This presents implications for
how research into deception detection is conducted
where participants are often automatically assigned to
deception or truth-telling conditions excluding an
individual’s intent to deceive in specific contexts.

4.4. Deception Tactics
The third meta-theme of ‘Deception Tactics’
emerged from the dataset where the role of context is
highlighted and different tactics for controlling
information, influencing and deceiving the target are
outlined. Sub-themes related to ‘Deception Tactics’
include: ‘Context’, ‘Control of Information’,
‘Influencers’, and ‘Replicating Genuine Behavior’.
‘Context’ plays a large role in which tactic the
deceiver will employ against the target, and how the
situation, including communication channel, may
change the form of interaction. Online communication
has changed elements of the deception context, where
there is a greater scale and reach of deceit and the
potential for anonymity. In military deception it is
argued that the same principles exist behind deception
although contextual changes with the development of

communication technologies have increased the range
for deception. Previous research into deception has
generally ignored the context of deception and how
this impacts upon the target and whether cues to
deception are generalizable across contexts. Research
by [18] highlights understanding that people will
behave according to the context they are in, this can
further be expanded to how groups and organizations
may seek to deceive others according to the situation.
The holistic model of deception places a strong
emphasis upon context and the situational factors that
may lead to a deceiver choosing a specific tactic of
deception.
‘Control of Information’ enables the deceiver to
control what information is portrayed to the target.
Through increasing the amount of information, the
target receives, the deceiver can increase target
ambiguity and cognitive load as there will be more
information to process reducing the target’s ability to
respond to a situation. Through decreasing the amount
of information, the target receives target ambiguity is
also increased as the target will have less information
with which to assess credibility. Deceivers often seek
to control the way in which they present information
whether verbal, non-verbal or physical to others and
previous research has highlighted that deceivers may
give shorter statements to their target to control their
narrative and ensure consistency [25], but may also
increase the number of individual details within their
statement [34], potentially as a way of distracting the
target from the deceptive content. Understanding how
the deceiver may control information and the way in
which they choose to release this information is
required in detecting deception as this affects the
strategy used to detect that deception.
‘Influencers’ highlights the various strategies that
individuals use to persuade the target of their
credibility. There are many techniques that can be used
to influence others in everyday interactions, whether
deception is occurring or not. Research examining
persuasion tactics has identified key areas for
influencing others [8] which has been applied to realworld activities, for example, advertising strategies.
However, examining the impact of influence tactics in
deception has been relatively neglected and the
proposed model seeks to incorporate these.
One technique of appearing credible to others is
through ‘Replicating Genuine Behavior’, whether the
perception of genuine behavior is based upon lay
beliefs or upon actual understanding of how to
replicate behavior an awareness of both will be
required to understand how differing individuals and
adversaries will behave.
Replicating genuine behavior and appearance is a
strategy that individuals seek to use in deceiving others
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[24], however, this strategy may not always be
effective as certain behaviors are harder to replicate in
some contexts [39]. To date psychological research
into exploring how deceivers replicate genuine
behavior has mainly focused upon examples of
deception in low-stakes environments where
individuals may not have time to develop a plan for
deception that often occurs in the strategic
environment. Further understanding of the strategies
that people use in high-stakes environments to appear
genuine to others is required.

4.5. Interpretation
The fourth meta-theme of ‘Interpretation’ emerged
from the dataset and lists the varying techniques and
areas of focus which are used in deception detection
across different communication mediums. Identified
sub-themes for the ‘Interpretation’ enable an analysis
of
information:
‘Source
Attributes’,
‘Questioning/Interviewing
Strategy’,
‘Detection
Methods’, ‘Surveillance and ISTAR’, and ‘Risk’. The
wide range of techniques uncovered for assessing
veracity may also enable the development of bespoke
strategies for detecting deception reflecting contexts in
which deception occurs. ‘Source Attributes’ examines
factors (consistency, plausibility, credibility and
prominence) that enable a source, whether the source is
an individual in a face-to-face setting or information in
an online domain, to appear credible.
Past research in interpersonal deception has
examined credibility as separate elements [49] rather
than seeking to combine them enabling more accurate
judgement about information. Research examining the
credibility of websites has taken a more holistic
approach to examining the source for credibility [13].
However, offering clear guidance on factors that
enable analysis of sources across different
communication channels as outlined above is required.
When interacting with potentially deceptive
individuals in dyadic or triadic conversation
‘Questioning/Interview Strategy’ plays an important
role in the generation of information to examine for
deception or identify discrepancies for further
examination, although as a factor it may not be
applicable to all contexts. The cognitive interview may
be used for questioning deceivers through discussing
their statements extensively before requiring the
deceiver to agree to their statement even if this
contrasts with external evidence. Questioning and
interviewing of individuals has often generated
information for further analysis and has the potential
for usage in conjunction with some verbal methods of
detecting deception. Its inclusion in a holistic model to
deception is required for usage in when we are

interacting with individuals in interpersonal
environments [9, 48].
Established techniques for examining information
and intelligence for credibility emerged from the data
set and ‘Detection Methods’ provide a range of
techniques to detect deception from psychological and
military backgrounds. Techniques to detect deception
include
verbal,
non-verbal,
pictorial,
neuropsychological, paralinguistic and techniques used
by military and intelligence personnel. These
techniques will be utilized as part of a toolbox
approach where the techniques used will fit the
requirements of the situation. Previous research has
begun to explore the use of multiple techniques to
detect deception [4] and has found higher accuracy
levels in detecting deception [39].
To
uncover
intelligence
for
assessment
‘Surveillance and ISTAR’ will enable the generation of
information through varying surveillance techniques
depending on the availability of channels for retrieving
information and evidence. ISTAR techniques
traditionally generate intelligence about an adversary
which can then be used to inform decision-making,
whilst approaches to deception detection have focused
on identifying cues to deceit, though combining
approaches verbal and non-verbal behavior can be
analyzed alongside other intelligence, reflecting how
deception is often detected in real-life [37].
In examining information for veracity there is
always an element of ‘Risk to Analyst’ involved where
incorrect decisions may have large consequences for
organizations and an ability to examine risk is required.
The impact of ‘Risk to Analyst’ on deception has been
generally neglected within the deception literature with
techniques focusing upon percentage of accuracy.
However, in real-life situations relying upon
probability may prove problematic, through adopting
multiple approaches to deception detection adverse risk
can be reduced.

4.6. Target
The final meta-theme of ‘Target’ emerged from the
dataset which focuses upon the targets decisionmaking abilities and the factors that may affect the
ability to accurately detect deception. Identified subthemes that will affect the target are: ‘Decision
Making’,
‘Stakes’,
‘Individual
Differences’,
‘Motivation’, and ‘Capabilities and Resources’.
‘Decision Making’ and how we make sense of the
world is key to effectively detecting deception and
mitigating risk. However, decision-making biases and
attribution errors that the deceiver exploits may
adversely affect the ability to detect deception.
Decision-making biases have partially explained the
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reasons for poor accuracy in detecting deceit, and an
awareness of these biases and the decision-making
process and their impact on the ‘Interpretation’ process
is recommended to reduce error in detecting deception.
The ‘Stakes’ of a situation will affect the receiver
and how they will judge a situation where potential
deception may be occurring. The impact of stakes on
the deceiver as this will affect their ability to appear
credible and enhance the target’s ability to more
accurately detect deception. In everyday acts of
deception, the deceit is often of little consequence and
are used to maintain social harmony [5] therefore the
target of that deceit may be less likely to question a
situation. In cases related to strategic interests then
stakes and the consequences of a decision will have a
larger impact on the target and how risk is assessed.
A wide range of ‘Individual Differences’ affect our
ability to accurately judge others including deception
detection. Individuals with specific personality traits
are better able to judge others personality, suggesting
that individuals with such traits will best be placed to
detect deception. Through understanding receiver
individual differences [1] awareness of potential
vulnerabilities and advantages emerges, and through
understanding these vulnerabilities the risk of
deception can be mitigated.
The target’s ‘Motivation’ to detect deception will
affect their ability to accurately detect deceit. Previous
research has identified that motivated individuals are
often less accurate in detecting deception [38], and this
may occur where individuals rely upon lay strategies
for detecting deception rather than cues identified by
research. However, where individuals are motivated
and have expertise in identifying genuine cues to
deceit, motivation may have a reduced impact on
decision-making errors.
Through understanding what ‘Capabilities and
Resources’ are available the target will be able to
ensure that they can recover information across varying
communication channels, and they will have sources of
expertise with which to analyze received information.

4.7. Limitations
The current research sought to validate and refine
the holistic model of deception proposed by [41] by
incorporating SME knowledge from a range of
research and practitioner backgrounds. Volunteer bias
suggests that this sample may not be representative of
all SMEs in the field of deception and related areas and
the specificity of the sample is acknowledged.
Difficulties were encountered in accessing participants
from security and intelligence backgrounds due to
security reasons; therefore, it is acknowledged that
there may be other techniques for detecting deception

in military environments that the research has not
incorporated into the holistic approach to deception.
Further research may seek to address this issue through
securing access to an SME sample with military and
intelligence backgrounds.

4.8. Future Directions
The current research validates and refines the
model of deception proposed by [41]; however,
although strategies used to detect deception proposed
by this model are outlined by SMEs there is a
requirement for empirical validation. Future research
should seek to examine the applicability of the model
to real-world deception challenges, with a specific
focus towards the online environment as an emerging
area of risk. ‘Red teaming’ presents an option where
rigorous analyses of the HMD can occur in a simulated
real-world environment [10].
The ’Deceiver’ meta-theme proposed by the current
research states a strong requirement for cultural
knowledge to understand an adversary and what may
affect their attempts at deception and its detection. In
addition, the focus on the mindset of individuals at any
time when there is the need to identify future intent and
incorporate an understanding of risk requires broader
perspectives to be taken. Developing knowledge of
these strategies may mitigate risk of deception.
However, there is a current lack of research into
cultural variations in how people deceive and seek to
deceive others, specifically in the online environment,
which presents additional challenges in an increasingly
globalized world where individuals from differing
cultural background interact daily, therefore future
research should seek to address these concerns.
In assessing credibility there is always an element
of risk involved in making decisions, especially in
high-stakes environments where there may be large
consequences for incorrect decisions. The current
research has identified as sub-theme of ‘Risk’ in
interpreting information that future research should
examine in depth to acknowledge the element of risk
involved in detecting deception and produce guidelines
for reducing risk in high-stakes deceit.
An example of how deception may be identified
and responded to may be developed from this model. If
the deceiver had identified deception, cyber-deception
through the range of identification tactics and strategies
outlined in this mode. If the deceiver has been
identified from their scent-trail or through mistakes in
their website credibility or discourse, then the receiver
can identify these mistakes and exploit them. They
may then deploy the range of deception tactics and
strategies outlined in this model. For example, if the
deceiver has attempted to gain information through
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phishing attacks, but has been identified then the target
may send them false information in order to mislead
them about their objectives.

5. Conclusion
In seeking to develop a holistic model of deception,
the model proposed by [41] has been partially
validated and refined through a series of interviews
conducted with SMEs across the field of deception and
influence. The current findings expand upon previous
research into deception through formulating deception
as a process whereby the deceiver conducts deception
to achieve an aim motivated by their goals and affected
by their culture, personality and mindset.
The
deceiver’s choice of tactics and strategies with which
to deceive will be reflective of context, communication
channels and resources available to them, whilst the
target has many techniques with which to interpret
information and assess credibility, and the target in
turn will be affected by individual differences,
available resources and decision-making ability. In
conclusion, it is argued that taking a more holistic
perspective to viewing deception is required to mitigate
risk.
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